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"YOU'VE GOT TO BE CAREFULLY TAUGHT":
JUSTIFYING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER
CROSON AND ADARAND
DONALD L. BESCHLE*
In this Article Professor Beschle assesses the continuing
legitimacy of affirmative action as a governmental response to
racial discrimination. The author begins with a historical
review of Supreme Court decisions in which the Court has
determined the circumstances under which affirmative action
programs are permissible. Next, Professor Beschle surveys
the views of contemporary social scientists who contend that
racial bias is an instinctive human characteristic, rather than
simply a learned attitude. Finally, the author considers the
implications of the work of these theorists for the future of
affirmative action. Professor Beschle concludes that the
ongoing need for governmental action to offset intransigent
human prejudice justifies the continuation of affirmative
action programs and that the social sciences provide vital
insights for the design of future efforts at affirmative action.
INTRODUCTION
You've got to be taught to hate and fear,
You've got to be taught from year to year,
It's got to be drummed in your dear little ear,
you've got to be carefully taught.
- Oscar Hammerstein II, South Pacific
When lyricist and former law student Oscar Hammerstein wrote
these lyrics for South Pacific, the modem civil rights movement was
still young; its major victories were years away. Segregation was still
legal, common, and widely accepted; but there was also much reason
for optimism. The armed forces had just been integrated, the 1948
Democratic Party platform had endorsed a civil rights plank strong
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. LL.M., 1983, Temple
University School of Law; J.D., 1976, New York University School of Law; B.A., 1973,
Fordham University.
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enough to spur segregationists to walk out of the convention and run
their own candidate,' and the litigation campaign that would
culminate in Brown v. Board of Education2 was underway.3 Thus,
it was not entirely surprising that Rodgers and Hammerstein would
create a musical that would address the problem of racism.
In 1949, the nation had just emerged from a crusade against Nazi
Germany and its ideology of racial purity. The contrast between the
articulated ideals for which millions of Americans proudly fought and
the persistent inequalities of American life created a dissonance that
would require resolution through the victories of the civil rights
movement.4 The first phase of the movement was aimed at the most
blatant and offensive forms of racial discrimination, those officially
endorsed and enforced by state law.5 The abolition of state-enforced
segregation led to the second phase, the 1960s movement to outlaw
racial discrimination by private parties in employment, housing, and
other decisions.6 The legitimacy of these claims is now conceded by
nearly all except those on the fringes of American political and legal
thought.7  Contemporary support for the principle of non-
1. See SEAN D. CASHMAN, AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS 99-108 (1991).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. For an extensive history of the legal strategies of the NAACP leading up to and
culminating in Brown, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 42-167 (1994).
For an insider's view of the same history, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS 54-211 (1994).
4. Gunnar Myrdal writes:
Fascism and nazism are based on a racial superiority dogma ... and they came
to power by means of racial persecution and oppression. In fighting fascism and
nazism, America had to stand before the whole world in favor of racial tolerance
and cooperation and of racial equality. It had to denounce German racialism as
a reversion to barbarism. It had to proclaim universal brotherhood and the
inalienable human freedoms.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1004 (20th anniversary ed., 1962). For a
description of civil rights activity during World War II, see PAULA F. PFEFFER, A. PHILIP
RANDOLPH, PIONEER OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 45-168 (1990). After the war,
"many Americans found segregation an embarrassment... that gave Soviet propagandists
ammunition .. . ." DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 143 (1991).
5. See GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 54-362.
6. See generally GERARD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 42-169 (1991)
(surveying and analyzing judicial, legislative, and executive action over the course of the
civil rights movement following the Brown decision). Rosenberg concludes that the role
of courts in bringing about change was relatively insignificant. Id. at 156.
7. There are exceptions. Richard Epstein mounts a "frontal intellectual assault" on
"the social consensus that supports one or another version of the modem an-
tidiscrimination principle," RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 6 (1992), arguing that free market
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discrimination can obscure the fact that the victories of the 1950s and
1960s were achieved only in the face of fierce opposition! At least
some of this opposition was based upon the claim that separation of
the races, and perhaps even hostility among them, was so prevalent
throughout human history that it could be described as part of human
nature.' One response to such a claim, of course, is that it is
irrelevant. To establish that something is "part of human nature" is
not to establish that it is just or desirable. Much of law quite openly
acts to counter what many would claim to be natural human
tendencies. Many thinkers contend that aggression and violence are
innate tendencies of human nature,'0 but that surely does not lead
them to the conclusion that society should not act to deter and, if
necessary, punish expression of the instinct.
Perhaps a more common response to the claim that racial bias is
natural, though, is, like Hammerstein, to deny it. People, one might
argue, are born without prejudice. It is entirely the consequence of
pernicious social influence. Eliminate the teaching and social
reinforcement of prejudice, and all would be well. This optimistic
view struck a responsive chord with many in the 1950s and 1960s, and
continues to do so. The view of human nature as intrinsically free of
bias may well have contributed to the essential victories of the civil
rights movement in that era; ironically, it may now serve to impede
further progress.
Since the late 1960s, the most controversial issue concerning civil
rights has been the question of the legitimacy of affirmative action."
pressures will solve the problems of racism better than government action, id. at 412-21.
For examples of responses, see Norman C. Amaker, Quittin' Time? The Antidiscrimination
Principle of Title VII vs. the Free Market, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (1993); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Second Chronicle The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1183
(1993).
8. See, e.g., FRED POWLEDGE, FREE AT LAST? 115-94, 253-332 (1991). For a
description of legislative opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see ROBERT D.
LOEVY, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE PoLITics OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 153-224, 287-314 (1990).
9. Thus, George Wallace argued that God intended the separation of the races and
that "[a]ll mankind is the handiwork of God." LOEVY, supra note 8, at 221. Myrdal wrote
of the importance of "the anti-amalgamation" doctrine as among races and its importance
in an America otherwise dedicated to the assimilation of immigrant cultures. MYRDAL,
supra note 4, at 50-67.
10. See, e.g., ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 332-44 (1966);
KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 23-48 (1966). Of course, not all agree. See, e.g.,
ERICH FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF HuMAN DESTRuCtIvENESS 89-184 (1973).
11. For representative academic positions on both sides of the issue, see Affirmative
Action Symposium, 21 GA. L. Rev. 1007 (1987); Symposium, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1199-1362
(1980); Symposium, Employment Discrimination, Affirmative Action and Multiculturalism,
1996] 1143
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Once overt discrimination against racial minorities is forbidden, may
government go further and target assistance to those same minorities?
Affirmative action has caused some rupture among those who made
up the early civil rights coalition;12 but to a large extent, the op-
ponents of affirmative action have been the very same people who
opposed enacting the nondiscrimination principle during the earlier
civil rights struggle. 3  These people now embrace the non-
discrimination principle and proclaim it to be the cornerstone of their
present stance. They argue that the abolition of overt racial
discrimination has returned us to a pristine state of equality. Any
attempt by the state to go further and tip the scales in favor of racial
minorities violates the nondiscrimination principle. They may once
have opposed that principle, but like the stereotypical religibus
convert, having seen the light, they now have become its most fervent
adherents, to the point of criticizing the backsliding of those who were
once believers, but have strayed. 4
This Article contends that courts, and even most advocates of
affirmative action, have accepted too uncritically as an analytical
starting point the proposition that people begin essentially bias-free
and develop racial prejudice only as a consequence of identifiable,
culpable acts by individuals or institutions. Under this view,
affirmative action must be justified by the identification of the guilty
act that has disturbed the status quo, and then must be tailored to do
41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1992).
12. See Morris B. Abram, Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, in RACIAL PREFERENCE
AND RACIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY (Russell Nieli
ed., 1991). Abrams, writing from a "perspective as an early participant in the civil rights
cause," praises the early vision of the civil rights movement, which he describes as aimed
at "equality of opportunity." Id. at 31. He laments the commitment of some of the civil
rights community, starting in the late 1960s, to "equality of results." Id. at 32.
13. For example, as a politically active journalist in the 1960s, Jesse Helms opposed
that decade's civil rights legislation; subsequently, as a United States senator, Helms
attempted to pre-empt the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by amending the existing 1964 Civil
Rights Act to provide that there be no preferential treatment accorded anyone in
employment on the basis of race. Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has
Come7 A Comparative Procedural History of The Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964 and 1991,
104 YALE L.J. 1201, 1209 (1995). Senator Strom Thurmond, who fought civil rights
legislation fiercely in the 1950s and 1960s, praised the Reagan-era U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights. Jocelyn C. Frye et al., Comment, The Rise and Fall of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 450-51 (1987).
14. For example, Ronald Reagan, whose first significant political activity was to
support Barry Goldwater, an opponent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, made opposition to
Carter administration affirmative action policies "a centerpiece of his campaign" in 1980,
and did so using the rhetoric of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination. Neal Devins,
The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1751 (1991).
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no more than return society to that initial, bias-free state. While no
one can seriously doubt that culture, society, and both formal and
informal education can nurture prejudice, social science provides
strong evidence that Hammerstein got it wrong. People naturally
tend to favor those most like themselves. It takes work to overcome
this tendency-to get people to the point where there is no more
"hate and fear." The abolition of invidious prejudice, when it occurs,
is one of society's finest accomplishments, not merely something that
comes naturally.
Once we realize that, in fact, "you've got to be carefully taught"
to regard people who are different in some salient way as nonetheless
equals, we can approach the question of affirmative action in a new
way. We can move beyond a focus on guilt or innocence, and toward
the achievement of a more equitable society, as the compelling
interest justifying at least some forms of affirmative action. But this
will require serious reconsideration of the premises, legal and
extralegal, that have formed the basis of the last twenty-five years of
the affirmative action debate.
Part I of this Article will sketch the debate in the courts over
affirmative action, culminating in the recent "strict scrutiny" cases of
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 5 and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 6 paying particular attention to the question of what
circumstances the Supreme Court has seen as justifying government
race consciousness. Part II will survey social science findings
suggesting that bias toward those like oneself is a pervasive human
trait, but one that can be countered by social institutions. Part III will
then discuss the relevance of these findings to the enterprise of
framing a new way to analyze the legitimacy of affirmative action.
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE COURTS: THE SEARCH
FOR GUILT
The modern history of affirmative action is generally regarded as
beginning with executive orders issued during the late 1960s and early
1970s by the Johnson and Nixon administrations. 7 But affirmative
15. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
16. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
17. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1988) (President Johnson); Exec. Order No. 11,458, 3 C.F.R. 779 (1969),
superceded by Exec. Order No. 11,625, 3 C.F.R. 616 (1971), reprinted as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 631 (1988) (President Nixon); Exec. Order No. 11,518, 3 C.F.R. 907 (1970),
reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 639 (1988) (President Nixon). Professor Devins points out that,
even prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, "the line separating equality of
1996] 1145
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action had a nineteenth century "prehistory," one that may shed some
light on the modem debate. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited at least the most blatant state-sponsored racial
discrimination.'" While neither provision was uncontroversial, 9
these steps were not only just, but also inevitable in light of the Union
victory.
To many, however, the formal equality called for by the Civil
War amendments seemed inadequate. In the wake of generations of
slavery, would not more be required to make equality, or at least
equal opportunity, a reality? Congress responded in two ways that
were to prove more controversial, and also more fragile, than the
amendments. First, while rejecting calls to redistribute the plantation
land of former slaveholders and provide newly freed slaves with "forty
acres and a mule,"'" Congress did establish the Freedman's
Bureau.' The Bureau had a mandate to provide education and
other forms of assistance to former slaves.' In its short lifetime, and
with limited resources, the Bureau did achieve some substantial
treatment from equality of result was blurred.... While President Kennedy argued against
'hard and fast quotas,' he also advised employers to 'look over employment rolls, look
over areas where we are hiring people and at least make sure we are giving everyone a
fair chance.' " Devins, supra note 14, at 1738 (citing PUB. PAPERS: JOHN F. KENNEDY,
1963, at 633-34). Thus, the suggestion that the 1964 Act envisioned rigid "colorblindness"
is at least questionable.
18. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. From its earliest days, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited blatant discrimination against blacks. See Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-10 (1879) (holding that the state could not bar blacks from
serving on juries).
19. See HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 55-
139 (1965); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 50-
288 (1984); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1974).
20. "The proslavery cause knew it had lost the slavery issue with the victory of
northern arms .. " Buchanan, supra note 19, at 7-8.
21. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND a MULE: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU
AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 181-83 (1978).
22. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat.
507; see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 755-75 (1985).
23. The 1865 Freedman's Bureau Act gave the Bureau "the control of all subjects
relating to refugees and freed men." Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. On its
face, the Bureau, then, was authorized to aid not only blacks, but also white war refugees.
In practice, the services were largely provided only to blacks. Schnapper, supra note 22,
at 760-61.
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success, especially in establishing schools.24 But from its inception,
it was highly controversial. Opponents characterized government
assistance to former slaves as an unwarranted advantage. They
argued that the war had sought only to establish formal, legal
equality.' In the face of sustained opposition, the Bureau was
allowed to expire in the early 1870s, barely a decade after the end of
the war.26
In addition, the Reconstruction-era Congress outlawed racial
discrimination by private parties operating public accommodations. 7
However, in the Civil Rights Cases" of 1883, the Supreme Court
held that Congress lacked the power to do this.29 Nineteenth
century concepts of the scope of federal power under the Commerce
Clause of Article I were too narrow to permit regulation of businesses
not engaged in shipping goods across state lines.30 The Court also
held that neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment
authorized Congress to go this far.3 ' Of particular interest for our
purposes is the language used by the Court to chide Congress for
providing former slaves with "special" privileges:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable con-
24. "In most years more than two-thirds of all funds expended by the Bureau were
used for the education of freedmen. In each of the years immediately prior and
subsequent to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Freedman's Bureau
educated approximately 100,000 students, nearly all of them black." Schnapper, supra note
22, at 780-81. Probably the most lasting legacy of the Bureau was the incorporation of
Howard University. Id.
25. In language reminiscent of modem criticism of affirmative action, opponents in the
1860s argued:
A proposition to establish a bureau of Irishmen's affairs, a bureau of Dutchman's
affairs, or one for the affairs of those of Caucasian descent generally, who are
incapable of properly managing or taking care of their own interests by reason
of a neglected or deficient education, would, in the opinion of your committee,
be looked upon as the vagary of a diseased brain.
H.R. REP. No. 2, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1864). For additional remarks by opponents
of government assistance to former slaves, see Schnapper, supra note 22, at 763-65.
26. Schnapper, supra note 22, at 783.
27. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
28. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
29. Id. at 25.
30. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1895) (holding that the
manufacture of goods is not interstate commerce justifying congressional regulation).
31. The Fourteenth Amendment was held to authorize Congress only to legislate
against state action. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-19. The Thirteenth Amendment,
which does apply to private, as well as state, action, was held to authorize Congress only
to address "badges and incidents of slavery," id at 20; denial of access to an inn, public
conveyance or theatre was held not to qualify as such, id. at 20-24.
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comitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws
32
This remarkable sentence encapsulates the debate over what
would later come to be known as affirmative action. Where is the
line between the protection of equality and the provision of special
favor? Is special favor ever warranted or even necessary as a means
of assuring actual equality? If so, is this merely a temporary
condition, or is there justification for extended, if not permanent,
measures? The nineteenth century judicial answer to these questions
was clear. In a world where permission to discriminate on the basis
of personal characteristics was the norm, to outlaw racial
discrimination by private parties was to provide special protection. 3
Less than twenty years after the abolition of slavery, after only
minimal efforts at "affirmative action" by the Freedman's Bureau, the
Supreme Court could, in effect, declare that the original state of
fairness had been restored 4.3  Further race-conscious aid to former
slaves was not only inappropriate; it was also unconstitutional.
Any questions about affirmative action obviously faded from the
scene as Plessy v. Ferguson35 endorsed the constitutionality of
segregation 6 The struggle to overrule Plessy took center stage for
decades, and would not be successful until Brown v. Board of
Education37 in 1954. The Civil Rights Act of 196438 and additional
civil rights legislation of the 1960s39 restored and expanded upon the
32. Id. at 25.
33. The assumption that the right to discriminate was the norm was cited by Senator
Strom Thurmond decades later in the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "Freedom
of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors; to use and dispose of his
property as he sees fit; to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal
relations are things all entitled to a large measure of protection from government
interference." Strom Thurmond, Statement (Radio) In Opposition to Proposed Statute
Which Would Make Businessmen Sell and Serve to Negroes, recorded 6 June 1963,
Speeches, Box 19, Thurmond Collection, quoted in LoEvy, supra note 8, at 166.
34. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Id. at 550-52.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975, 2000a to 2000h-5 (1994)).
39. Most significantly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)) and the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3533,
3601 to 3614, 1614a, 3615 to 3619, 3631 (1994)). For a comprehensive history of the
adoption of these statutes and their affirmance by the Supreme Court, see STATUTORY
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guarantees of nondiscrimination struck down in 1883. By the mid-
1960s, these statutes were no longer seen by most people as providing
"special" treatment. The baseline from which most Americans
calculated was now a norm of non-prejudice, at least with respect to
race. Thus, while there was strong opposition to the legislation of the
1960s, prevailing sentiment saw it as merely fixing a distortion of the
natural state of things, much like the abolition of slavery had been a
century earlier.
But in the late 1960s, as in the late 1860s, victory struck many
civil rights advocates as, if not hollow, at least incomplete. Echoing
advocates of the Freedman's Bureau, modem voices persuasively
argued that decades of injustice called for more than merely banning
future acts of overt racial discrimination. Government should take
positive steps to achieve real, not merely formal, equality. But here,
as in the nineteenth century, opposition was, over time, effective in
the political and judicial arenas.
The first form of modem "affirmative action" to be passed upon
by the Supreme Court to a large extent established the model for
analysis of subsequent cases. This precursor involved busing and
other steps toward integrating public schools, measures we would not
now identify as affirmative action. The Brown decision called for an
end to formal segregation, but it did not explicitly call for positive
steps to assure the actual integration of schools.' Southern resis-
tance to even minimal compliance led to demands for more forceful
action. By the late 1960s, courts were ordering states and localities to
take positive actions, such as busing to achieve racial balance, in
addition to merely removing formal barriers to integration.4' Of
course, such steps require government sensitivity to the racial
composition of public schools. Opponents, then, could claim that
these remedies themselves violated Brown's command that
government be "colorblind."
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIvIL RIGHTS: PART II 1467-1837 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1970).
40. The 1954 Brown decision remanded the case to the district court to consider the
question of remedies. 347 U.S. at 495-96. This led to "Brown II," Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), which called for "such orders... as are necessary and proper
to admit to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed
the parties to these cases." Id. at 301.
41. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). For a summary of desegregation decisions
nationwide during the late 1960s and early 1970s, see GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 11-
39 (1978).
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In 1971, the Supreme Court upheld race-conscious remedies in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.42 The Court
focused on the fact that busing and other steps ordered by the lower
court were in response to past state-sponsored segregation.43 State
and local school authorities had " 'the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary' "' to end racial discrimination;
where they failed, "the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad."'45 The reasoning of Swann can fit
comfortably into the framework of strict scrutiny. Government-in
this case the federal courts-may do what is necessary to achieve the
compelling interest of eliminating the effect of past constitutional
violations.
But Swann's holding that race-conscious remedies were
authorized to eliminate the effects of past de jure segregation could
easily become a principle that only a showing of past guilt could
justify such action. Indeed, subsequent cases established that a school
district that had not violated the Constitution could not be included
in a court-ordered busing plan. 6 A link was thus established
between race-conscious action benefitting minorities and a par-
ticularized finding of guilt on the part of those required to act. To
put it another way, race-conscious action benefitting minorities was
viewed as a penance for past sins with the aim of restoring the pre-sin
state, presumably one of race-neutral harmony.
This analysis is unsurprising in light of the fact that it arose from
a court reviewing the actions of another court. The classic model of
the role of the judiciary is one that involves a finding of guilt, or at
least of fault, that declines to disturb the status quo in the absence of
such a finding, and that seeks only to restore the status quo rather
than actively to pursue social change.4' Some may argue that this
42. 402 U.S. 1, 22-31 (1971).
43. Id. at 6-11.
44. Id. at 15 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38).
45. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
46. The key decision was Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), reversing a district
court plan that would have required integration of the Detroit schools and those of a
number of suburban districts, where findings of past segregation were limited to Detroit.
Id at 745-47.
47. Sir William Blackstone writes:
Now, since all wrongs may be considered as merely a privation of right, the plain
natural remedy for every species of wrong is the being put in possession of that
right whereof the party injured is deprived. This may either be effected by a
specific delivery or restoration of the subject-matter in dispute to the legal owner
... or, where that is not a possible, or at least not an adequate, remedy, by
1150 [Vol. 74
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model is more myth than reality, but even if it is, it is undoubtedly a
powerful myth, with an impact on the reality of judicial behavior.48
The model of legitimate behavior by the political branches of
government is quite different. Legislatures need not confine
themselves to repairing cracks in the status quo. They are expected
to be forward-looking, to change things for the better. Of course,
they must do so within the constraints of the Constitution. Thus,
when courts were called upon to review segregation and other forms
of government action clearly disfavoring racial minorities, it was
clearly a large step toward the equality envisioned by the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike them down, and to do so by formulating the
principle that the Constitution is "colorblind." But what would be the
consequences of that attitude when courts were called upon to review
efforts to improve the status of racial minorities, efforts that might not
be clearly limited to fixing the consequences of prior illegal acts?
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,49 a sharply
divided Court ruled on an affirmative action plan implemented by the
medical school of the University of California at Davis, a young
school with no history of discrimination. 0 The school reserved 16
of the 100 seats in its entering class for "economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged" applicants.5' While the formal criteria
for inclusion in this group did not exclude whites, only blacks,
Mexican-Americans and Asians were admitted on this basis. 52
Four Justices would have held that this program violated federal
statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in higher education; they felt
no need, then, to address the question of whether the program would,
making the sufferer a pecuniary satisfaction in damages ....
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1112 (W. Lewis ed. 1902).
48. For example, when Warren and Brandeis advocated the recognition of a right to
privacy by courts, they did not merely advocate it as a good thing, but argued that it was
implicit in existing common law. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197-213 (1890). In other words, one who violated it was
disturbing the status quo as to rights. See also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 450-54 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds.
1994) (outlining the Warren-Brandeis argument that a right of privacy was a natural
development from common law principles).
49. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
50. Id. at 272. The school opened in 1968 and began affirmative action admissions in
the early 1970s. Id.
51. Id. at 274.
52. Id. at 275-76. "Indeed, in 1974, at least, the special [admissions] committee
explicitly considered only 'disadvantaged' special applicants who were members of one of
the designated minority groups." Id. at 276.
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if permitted by statute, nonetheless violate the Constitution."3 Four
Justices would have upheld the program. 4 They read the statutes
as barring only discrimination that would violate the Constitution."5
This conclusion, of course, made it necessary to address the
constitutional question. These Justices felt that "benign" racial
classifications could be upheld if they "serve[d] important government
objectives and... [were] substantially related to those objectives. 516
Eliminating "serious and persistent underrepresentation of minorities
in medicine," which could be seen as a consequence of past social
discrimination even if no specific guilt could be attributed to the
medical school at Davis, would serve as such an objective.5 7 Justice
Powell cast the deciding vote against the program in question, but in
favor of the proposition that some affirmative programs could be
justified. 8 Using the language of strict scrutiny, but in a way that
would not guarantee that all programs must fail, Justice Powell
maintained that an interest other than remedying past constitutional
violations might serve to justify race-conscious acts. 9 In the context
of higher education specifically, Justice Powell found such an interest
in the enhancement of the educational environment caused by a
diverse student body.' But, Justice Powell insisted, that interest
must be pursued through narrowly tailored means. Race may not
override all other factors, but it may be one part of the mix of
considerations in the admissions process.6' Bakke, then, endorsed
the proposition that at least some affirmative action programs could
be forward-looking and could be justified even in the absence of
specific fault on the part of the entity adopting them for past racial
discrimination. It did so, however, by the most fragile of margins.
53. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 408.
54. la at 324-79 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Id. at 324.
55. ld at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 370-71 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
58. Id. at 319-20.
59. Id. at 311-14. Justice Powell found that the university's decision that a diverse
student body would promote the overall quality of education raised issues of academic
freedom, which "though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment." Id. at 312.
60. Id at 312.
61. Id. at 314-19.
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Even affirmative action's strongest supporters on the Court focused
more on past guilt, albeit that of society as a whole, than on the
future.
Justice Powell's forward-looking rationale lost ground in
subsequent cases. Cases after Bakke, most of them involving
employment rather than education, overwhelmingly focused on the
existence and specificity of past guilt to justify affirmative action.
Consciously or not, the judicial model that privileges the status quo
until concrete specific fault is established, and then tailors a remedy
to restore the state of things prior to the violation but to go no
further, has become almost the exclusive analytical tool.
Thus, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,62 the Court
rejected the contention that a racially diverse public school faculty
would enhance the educational environment as a sufficient jus-
tification for race consciousness in a school district's layoff policy.63
Most of the dissenters pointed to past discrimination in arguing in
favor of the plan; only Justice Stevens shifted the focus of inquiry:
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past
to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in
employing more black teachers in the future. Rather than
analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority
teachers have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a
remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I believe
that we should first ask whether the Board's action advances
the public interest in educating children for the future.65
This is the most succinct call for a forward-looking approach, one
that does not exclusively focus on guilt, in affirmative action
jurisprudence. But it has been a call that has gone unanswered. For
the most part, the cases have turned on questions of guilt and
innocence. Is the party implementing the plan guilty of past
discrimination? How specific must guilt be? How badly does the
program hurt "innocent" victims?66 By no means has this meant an
62. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
63. Id. at 274-76. The specific contention of the school board was the need for more
minority faculty role models. Id. at 274. The Court found this too amorphous, and
essentially the equivalent of merely relying on "societal discrimination." Id. at 276.
64. Justice Marshall, in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, outlined
a history supporting a finding of past discrimination in hiring. Id. at 297-99 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. The "innocent victims" argument appeared quite significant in Wygant, particularly
to Justice White, who cast the deciding vote. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring). Layoffs
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unbroken line of rejection for affirmative action. In several cases in
which reasonably strong showings of past discrimination were made,
the Court approved not only Bakke-like use of race as a factor, but
also the use of numerical goals in hiring and promotion.67 Still,
divisions on the Court both as to outcomes and reasoning persisted.
It was not until 1989 that a clear majority emerged for application of
a single approach.
In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,6  the Court held that
state or local efforts to implement affirmative action must survive
strict scrutiny.69 This, said the Court, would not be an invariably
fatal test.7" But, except for Justice Stevens,7' the majority appeared
to regard "rectify[ing] the effects of identified discrimination" as
essentially the only interest justifying race-conscious remedies. 72
Even then, the Court would have preferred a race-neutral response."
The window for permissible race-conscious action was summarized in
one sentence: "In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored
racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of
deliberate exclusion." 74
Once again, even the dissenters spoke primarily in terms of
remedying the past. Unlike the majority, they would have been
willing to take note of discrimination by society at large, or by a
have been consistently held to be more problematic than refusals to hire or promote, since
these impinge upon, if not vested rights, at least "settled expectations" of white workers.
See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1533-37 (1988).
67. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,166-67 (1987); Sheet Metal Workers, Local
28 v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,482-83 (1986); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987) (upholding a gender-based affirmative action policy).
68. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
69. Id. at 493-98. As Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, this was the first time
that a majority of the Court unambiguously endorsed strict scrutiny as the appropriate
standard for review of affirmative action programs. Id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 509-11.
71. "I ... do not agree with the premise that seems to underlie today's decision...
that a governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissible except
as a remedy for a past wrong." Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
72. Id. at 509.
73. The majority stated:
Simplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and
training and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races would open
the public contracting market to all those who have suffered the effects of past
societal discrimination or neglect.... The city may also act to prohibit
discrimination in the provision of credit or bonding by local supplies and banks.
Business as usual should not mean business pursuant to the unthinking exclusion
of certain members of our society from its rewards.
Id. at 509-10.
74. Id. at 509.
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particular profession-not merely discrimination by the specific entity
administering the affirmative action program7 --but still the focus of
the dissenters remained on guilt at some level. Affirmative action
continued to be a remedy for a specific wrong, a punishment for guilt,
aimed only at restoring the pre-guilt status quo of nondiscrimination.
Croson was distinguished a year later in Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC.76 Citing the 1980 case of Fullilove v. Klutznick," the Court
held that an affirmative action plan adopted by Congress rather than
by a state or locality should be evaluated under something less than
strict scrutiny.78 This, held the narrow five-four majority, was due to
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment giving Congress the
power to enact legislation in pursuit of the goal of equal protection.79
Thus, more deference was due to a congressionally adopted affir-
mative action plan. The Court accepted the goal of achieving
diversity in programming as justifying an FCC program making
minority ownership a factor in awarding broadcast licenses.0 This
holding can be seen as a victory for forward-looking affirmative
action; it did not rest on FCC culpability in prior licensing decisions.
But the victory was temporary. The recent Supreme Court decision
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena"' overruled Metro Broadcas-
ting, holding that federal, as well as state and local, affirmative action
programs must be subjected to strict scrutiny.' At the same time,
however, Justice O'Connor's opinion emphasized that strict scrutiny
did not, in this context, inevitably mean invalidation of all affirmative
action programs:
75. While the dissenters insisted that Richmond had made a sufficient particularized
showing of past discrimination in the local contracting industry, id. at 530-35 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), they also cited the general, pervasive history of discrimination in Richmond,
id. at 544-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
77. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Court held that Congress had the authority to enact
affirmative action programs that were narrowly tailored to eliminate discrimination; these
would be judged by a less rigid standard than the one used in Bakke. IL at 490-92.
78. The majority stated:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress--even if
those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate
victims of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally
permissible to the extent that they serve important government objectives within
the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.
497 U.S. at 564-65.
79. Id. at 563.
80. Id. at 566-79.
81. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
82. Id. at 2112-13.
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The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.
... When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional
constraints if it satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test ....
Thus, the question of what qualifies as a compelling interest
remains significant. There is much in Adarand to support the notion
that only clearly identified past discrimination will suffice. The Court
quoted Wygant to the effect that a showing of "societal
discrimination" is an insufficient foundation for affirmation action.' 4
In describing Metro Broadcasting and its perceived flaws, the Court
stressed that "the FCC policies at issue did not serve as a remedy for
past discrimination." 5  Even the dissenters, apart from Justice
Stevens,16 characterized the core purpose of affirmative action as "to
remedy past discrimination,"'  while differing on how much
deference should be given to a congressional finding that a particular
program serves that end. s
On the other hand, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court
approvingly cited Justice Powell in Bakke as applying strict scrutiny
to affirmative action, and in that case, Justice Powell explicitly stated
that the forward-looking interest of a school in a diverse student body
could justify some forms of affirmative action. 9 Further, Justice
Stevens expressed hope that a significant part of Metro Broadcasting
had survived:
Thus, prior to Metro Broadcasting, the interest in diversity
had been mentioned in a few opinions, but it is perfectly
clear that the Court had not yet decided whether that
83. Id. at 2117.
84. Id. at 2109.
85. Id. at 2112.
86. Justice Stevens restated his position that seeking future benefits of diversity can
serve as a sufficient interest to justify narrowly tailored affirmative action programs, even
under a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He further pointed
out that the majority endorsed the version of strict scrutiny Justice Powell used in Bakke,
a decision which was not based upon particularized past discrimination. Id. at 2127
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, he contended, Adarand does not require the conclusion
that all affirmative action must be remedial. Id. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. l at 2132-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also noted that the majority
endorsed Justice Powell's version of strict scrutiny, and that Powell concurred in upholding
the affirmative action program of Fullilove. Id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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interest had sufficient magnitude to justify a racial clas-
sification. Metro Broadcasting, of course, answered that
question in the affirmative. The majority today overrules
Metro Broadcasting only insofar as it is 'inconsistent with
[the] holding' that strict scrutiny applies to 'benign' racial
classifications promulgated by the Federal Government....
The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a
sufficient interest to justify such a program is not inconsis-
tent with the Court's holding today-indeed, the question is
not remotely presented in this case-and I do not take the
Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our decision in
Metro Broadcasting.90
Justice Stevens, then, continues to advocate a forward-looking
approach to affirmative action, and reminds us that the possibility of
such an approach has not yet been definitely foreclosed, even in the
era of strict scrutiny.9' Still, the general tenor of recent opinions
suggests that the Court will find a compelling purpose for affirmative
action only in conjunction with a reasonably particularized showing of
guilt somewhere in the past. Explicitly or implicitly, affirmative action
is treated as a court would treat punishment; that is, affirmative action
is inappropriate in the absence of a clear finding of fault.
As we have seen, the model of affirmative action as punishment
had its seeds in the school desegregation cases, when courts were
called upon to compel compliance with the letter and spirit of Brown.
Courts, of course, disturb the status quo only upon a showing of fault.
They have a commission only to repair, not a general commission to
improve, the status quo; but this model has carried over to the
Supreme Court's analysis of legislative efforts at affirmative action,
and that is troubling.
In a legislative forum, the status quo is less privileged than it is
in a court. A legislature need only determine that the status quo is
inadequate to carry out legitimate ends; it need not determine that
someone, or even society at large, is somehow "guilty" in order to
act.92 To demand an initial showing of guilt as a prerequisite is to
90. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Hans Linde notes that:
The simplest model of a 'case' is the decision of a dispute between two parties
by an impartial judge .... The proceeding will be initiated by one party, private
or public, who has some claim against another .... It is not initiated by the
court.... The proper extent of remedial action must be argued.... By contrast
.... [t]he objective [of legislative action] is not to decide what existing law means
or how it applies to disputed facts, but to choose a policy and translate it into the
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treat a legislative act as if it were a judicial act. This may be at the
heart of the confusion regarding affirmative action.
An imperfect, but instructive, analogy might be drawn with
judicial responses to acts of private corporations. If A seeks
compensation for injuries from B, a corporation, and B resists, a court
will no doubt focus on the question of whether B is at fault for
causing the injury to A. A court would surely not award compen-
sation simply on the grounds that society would be better off if a sum
of money were transferred from B to A.
But if B, out of a charitable impulse, decided to contribute to a
fund to pay the medical bills of A, to whom it had no legal obligation,
would a court necessarily find that this would violate the rights of a
dissenting shareholder who complains that the money should be
retained by the corporation or paid out as a dividend? Here, the
court will look to whether B is pursuing a legitimate corporate
purpose, but it will not see expiation of B's guilt as the only possible
justification.93 Such forward-looking concerns as improving the
company's image or strengthening the community in which it operates
might justify this act of charity. In short, a voluntary act to make
things better is not treated the same way as a demand that a reluctant
party act to the same end.
Of course, one might respond that the analogy is inappropriate
since it does not involve a constitutional command. Government,
under Brown, has the obligation not to discriminate on the ground of
race. This obligation is weightier than the corporate duty to act for
the benefit of its shareholders, and demands a more rigorous
justification. This may or may not be a valid point, but for our
purposes it may be less important than a more subtle one.
In the normal course of things, a corporation or a legislature has
great leeway to act to change things for the better because it is
implicitly accepted that the status quo is imperfect. If we somehow
could establish that corporate welfare was at its absolute maximum
prior to a decision to make a charitable contribution, it might then be
concrete form of a new law .... Of course... these are oversimplified models
HANS LINDE Er AL., LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 49 (1981).
93. See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398,404-05 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(holding that corporations are authorized to make reasonable charitable gifts). For an
overview of courts' treatment of corporations in these situations, see Kenneth B. Davis,
Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder
Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7
(1988).
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said that a decision to make the contribution was improper. Of
course, such an argument rarely, if ever, will arise. A condition of
imperfection is assumed to exist; but in the field of affirmative action,
there seems to be an implicit assumption that the starting point for
individuals and society is perfect, that is, one of no discrimination on
grounds of race or other illegitimate concerns. Since the norm is
nondiscrimination, courts are skeptical of whether discrimination
exists in any concrete situation.94 This may explain why evidence of
intent is required to find a constitutional violation;95 a discriminatory
effect is likely to come from something other than race consciousness
since "colorblindness" is the norm. Discrimination must be proven.
Where discrimination is proven, it may be dealt with, but only to
restore the status quo that existed prior to the specific act of
discrimination that disturbed the "colorblind" starting point. Courts,
then, are operating from the same premises as Hammerstein was in
South Pacific. The natural state for people is one of non-
discrimination. Where discrimination exists it must be due to some
discrete decision by an individual or a social institution to disturb the
status quo. Eliminate that sin, and nondiscrimination is restored.
Any race-consciousness beyond that point itself disturbs the natural
harmony among races.
For the most part, both sides have implicitly adopted this world
view for the affirmative action debate. The debate, then, becomes
one largely devoted to examining the past for evidence of guilt,
leveling charges of guilt, issuing denials, and determining a resolution
that leaves at least one side, and perhaps both, feeling victimized.
But is this the only possible approach to the pursuit of racial equality?
Perhaps more importantly, is this approach based upon an accurate
view of the nature of discrimination?
II. Is DISCRIMINATION ALWAYS A CONSEQUENCE OF GUILT?
Apart from the fringes of American legal and political debate,
almost all would agree that in an ideal world, race would be an
irrelevant consideration in allocating scarce economic resources or
social rewards. The total defeat of the explicit defense of segregation
and white supremacy is perhaps most strikingly evident in the fact
94. Current law "assumes that the interaction of private forces will automatically yield
just outcomes so long as government coercion is avoided." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586-87 (1991).
95. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976).
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that not only the intellectual and political heirs of those who
virulently defended segregation, but in some cases those very same
people now fervently invoke the language of "colorblindness" and
rigid racial neutrality in their opposition to affirmative action. 6
This language is enormously appealing; but to what extent does
it describe the world as it exists without active social intervention, and
to what extent does it merely describe an aspiration that will require
much conscious effort to achieve? Surely, history suggests that great
caution is appropriate when government takes race into account. As
we have seen, no voices on the Supreme Court have seriously
advocated permitting race-conscious action without some reasonably
strong effort to justify it.97 Successful justifications have usually been
"backward-looking," that is, framed as remedies for past acts of
discrimination clearly departing from the ideal of race neutrality.8
Occasionally a Supreme Court Justice or academic commen-
tator"° will argue for the legitimacy of "forward-looking" jus-
tifications. Such an argument contends that the political branches of
government are not limited to fixing discrete past wrongs, but may
also further the goal of bringing about, in fact, a race-neutral society.
While much can be said for a "forward-looking" approach, the
tendency of courts to more readily accept the notion of affirmative
96. See supra notes 13-14.
97. To the contrary:
Undoubtedly, a court should be wary of a governmental decision that relies upon
a racial classification. 'Because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant
basis for disparate treatment, and because classifications based on race are
potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,' a reviewing court must satisfy
itself that the reasons for any such classification are "clearly identified and
unquestionably legitimate."
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S.
448, 533-35 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). "My view has long been that race-conscious
classifications designed to further remedial goals 'must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives' in order
to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Croson, 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,359 (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
98. See supra notes 62-91 and accompanying text.
99. Most significantly, Justice Powell in Bakke, see supra notes 50-61 and accom-
panying text, and, consistently, Justice Stevens, see supra notes 65, 71, 86, 90-91 and
accompanying text, make this argument.
100. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the
Concept of 'Diversity,' 1993 WIs. L. REv. 105, 153-61; Michel Rosenfeld, Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583, 599-609, 631-35 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91-98
(1986).
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action as punishment for past sins has led most advocates of such
programs also to adopt the language of remediation. Commonly,
affirmative action will be justified as a response to "institutional
racism," that is, a racism that is not necessarily the fault of any
particular party, but rather the consequence of decades, even
centuries of acts, conscious and unconscious. 10 1
Calls for the recognition of "institutional racism," however, draw
great opposition. This is not surprising. Perhaps the most frequent
argument made by opponents of affirmative action is that they, as
individuals, are "innocent."'" They did not own slaves-in most
cases neither did their direct ancestors-and no one can point to
instances in which they personally discriminated against racial
minorities in hiring or other decisions. 3 The acceptance of guilt is
not psychologically easy even when personal responsibility is
clear." 4 Where there is no sense of personal responsibility, the call
to acknowledge guilt is likely to be resisted even more fiercely.105
As Professor Kathleen Sullivan has pointed out, these charges of
unconscious or institutional racism in some ways resemble notions of
original sin; °6 but in a very individualistic society, demands that one
do something to atone for one's share of original sin do not draw a
positive response.0 7 This problem is compounded by the fact that
101. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987).
102. Thus, Justice Powell criticized the affirmative action plan at issue in Bakke for
punishing "innocent" whites for "grievances, not of their making." 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561, 575 (1984) (holding that "it is inappropriate to deny an innocent employee the
benefits of his seniority in order to provide a remedy in a pattern-or-practice suit such as
this").
103. See Sullivan, supra note 100, at 85-86.
104. See Kate Nace Day, The Moral Confusion of Affirmative Jurisprudence or When
Will We Learn to Bear the Shame of Guilt?, 16 VT. L. REV. 777, 803-34 (1992).
105. Herbert Morris writes:
[T]he claim that we are all responsible for everything, particularly when tied to
narrower cases, say, being told that as whites we are responsible for the condition
of the black man, responsible even for the evils perpetuated before our birth,
produces not just intellectual disagreement, not just critical analysis but
unquestionably, in the case of some people, considerable anger ....
HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 116 (1976), quoted in Day, supra note 104,
at 820.
106. Sullivan, supra note 100, at 91-92.
107. Kathleen Sullivan writes:
[A] focus on sin begets claims of innocence. Making an employer or union atone
for its past discrimination would all be very well, these claims go, but that is not
what affirmative action does. For it is not the errant management that "pays"
for affirmative action, but "innocent" white workers. And retribution breaks
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in contemporary usage the word "racist" is a powerful epithet. In the
famous case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"~ the Supreme
Court recognized the incendiary potential of epithets in limiting the
First Amendment protection given to even politically tinged "fighting
words."'" In the early 1940s, "fascist" was a powerful charge. It is
unlikely that calling someone an "unconscious fascist" or an
"institutional fascist" would have been that much less an insult.
Furthermore, while a charge of racism may not lead to physical
retaliation, it is more likely to lead to strong, reflexive denial than to
acceptance and action to reform.
By framing the debate as one of guilt, both sides, although they
put forward different definitions of guilt and reach different
conclusions as to whether it exists, implicitly accept a crucial starting
point. As reflected in Hammerstein's lyrics, the implicit assumption
is that the starting point for the human condition is one of acceptance
of differences, and the absence of any biases. Racism, or other
invidious prejudices, are the consequence, however indirect, only of
discrete social decisions to move away from that position. If no
evidence of particular guilt can be established, then there is no
problem for government to remedy. Only a remedy can satisfy the
call for heightened or strict scrutiny, not a program merely seeking to
improve things, since, after all, a bias-free situation cannot be
improved upon.
Perhaps we should accept the notion that only government acts
that seek to fix a problem, in this case the existence of racial bias,
should satisfy strict scrutiny. If so, might there be a significant
problem utterly unconnected with "guilt," even of the "institutional"
down when aimed at innocent targets. Dead bosses' guilt cannot taint live
workers' jobs.
Id. at 94. Professor Day discusses the distinction between guilt, which focuses on a
personal transgression, and shame:
It is possible that the observer might experience a sense of shame even though
she does not feel that she herself has personally transgressed a moral principle.
Normally, we do not feel guilt for another person's actions. But, it can be
otherwise with shame.... The observer feels shame because she identifies with
a larger group which includes those who are guilty.
Day, supra note 104, at 815-16. American law, notes Professor Day, is focused on guilt
rather than shame. Id. at 831-34.
108. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
109. Id. at 573. The defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance forbidding
anyone from calling another by "any offensive or derisive name." Id. at 569. His use of
the words "God damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" were held not to be protected
by the First Amendment since they were "fighting words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572.
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sort? To locate such a problem, a response to which might well serve
as a compelling government interest, we must begin by asking
whether our suppositions about human reaction to encounters with
difference are correct.
Social scientists and psychologists have put forward a number of
different theories to explain the existence of prejudice. As Professor
John Duckitt has noted, different theories have been stressed at
different times, and usually the proponents of any theory do not claim
that one explanation is exclusive; instead, there seem to be several
causal factors working together in any society."0 Before 1920, there
was essentially no work done on the subject of prejudice because the
existence of real differences between the races was widely, if not
universally, accepted. Thus, "prejudice" was not seen as a problem.
"Attitudes of racial superiority or antipathy to Blacks were widely
accepted as inevitable and natural responses to the seemingly obvious
'inferiority' and 'backwardness' of Blacks and other colonial
peoples.'
Starting around 1920, however, the dominant thinking began to
shift: "In 1920, most psychologists believed in the existence of mental
differences between races; by 1940 they were searching for the sources
of 'irrational prejudice.' ""' If stigmatization and ostracism of
minorities were not the consequences of real difference, what did
cause racial and other forms of prejudice? Different theories
emerged. On the simplest level, they could be divided into two types:
those that see prejudice as originating within the individual and those
that see prejudice as externally imposed by society."' Within these
broad categories, further distinctions were drawn.
Early studies, during the 1930s and 1940s, looked primarily to the
individual. Although it might be triggered by external social stress or
frustration," 4 "prejudice could be seen as the result of the operation
of universal psychological processes such as defense mechanisms.""' 5
110. John Duckitt, Psychology and Prejudice: A Historical Analysis and Integrative
Framework, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1182, 1182-83 (1992).
111. Id. at 1183-85.
112. Franz Samuelson, From 'Race Psychology' to 'Studies in Prejudice" Some
Observations on the Thematic Reversal in Social Psychology, 14 J. HIsT. BEHAVIORAL ScI.
265, 265 (1978), quoted in Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1185.
113. "[lit has been suggested that only two basic kinds of theory or levels of analysis
are needed-societal-level sociological theories, on the one hand, and individual-level
psychological theories, on the other hand." Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1182.
114. Id. at 1186.
115. Id. at 1185.
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This tendency to scapegoat, or to displace hostility toward outsiders,
could be seen as something present to some degree in everyone, and
therefore could explain the nearly universal presence of prejudice
against minority or other outgroups.
116
During the 1950s, focus remained on the individual, but prejudice
was less likely to be seen as normal and universal. Instead, perhaps
largely in response to the experience of Nazism, prejudice was now
seen as a pathology."7 Consequently, the crucial social scientific
question became that of identifying and describing the personality
structures and characteristics making individuals prone to
prejudice."' This was the era that gave rise to the famous descrip-
tions of the authoritarian personality" 9 and the tolerant per-
sonality."°  Prejudice was something to be found only in certain
individuals and addressed as any other individual pathology.
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the dominant explanations
shifted from individual psychology to external social and cultural
factors.' If prejudice was an aberration, as contended in the
dominant theories of the 1950s, then how could extremely widespread
prejudice in certain social groups or regions be explained? In its
simplest form, this new theory would maintain that "prejudice is to be
understood as a social or cultural norm, and that, furthermore, when
this is not the case, it is unlikely to be of social significance."'" The
work of eliminating prejudice, then, would focus on changing social
norms, beginning, of course, with the law. As Duckitt has noted, this
is "a basically optimistic view of the future of race relations.""
Eliminating segregation and outlawing overt racism would eliminate
the essential social supports, and therefore, eliminate prejudice itself.
More so than the dominant theories of the 1930s, 1940s and
1950s, these social-cultural theories have been put to the empirical
test. Changes in law and social attitudes concerning the acceptability
of racial prejudice may have reduced levels of prejudice, but they
116. Id. at 1185-86.
117. Id. at 1186-87.
118. Id. at 1186.
119. See generally THEODOR W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
(1950) (providing a post-World War II study of the "potentially fascist individual").
120. See generally James G. Martin & Frank R. Westie, The Tolerant Personality, 24
AM. Soc. REV. 521 (1959) (presenting a study of factors leading individuals to tolerance).
121. Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1187-88.
122. Id. at 1187 (quoting John C. Turner & Howard Giles, Introduction, INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOUR 12 (John C. Turner & Howard Giles eds., 1981)).
123. Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1187.
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have by no means eliminated it." Some of those committed to
external explanations of prejudice explain its persistence in terms of
quite rational self-interest. Whites simply seek to maintain ad-
vantageous positions in the labor market and elsewhere in society.'25
But several studies indicate that political positions such as opposition
to affirmative action or opposition to the election of a black mayor
are not correlated with the degree to which whites actually feel their
concrete interests challenged." Rather, they are largely a matter
of symbolism.27
A large body of relatively recent research seems to return in
some ways to the model prevalent in the 1930s, that is, the position
that there is a normal, if not universal, tendency to categorize others
as like and unlike oneself, and to display a bias toward one's "in-
group." By no means does this deny the significance of external
social norms. Such norms can act to reinforce and nurture this
tendency; they can also act to counter it. It appears, though, that
social norms do not fully explain the existence of bias."
Experiments have shown consistently that people are more likely
to act in an altruistic way toward strangers whom the subject believes
to be like him or her. Thus, people will more likely refuse to assist
foreigners, or those who do not speak the native language well, than
124. See Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 560 (1980)
(concluding that attitudes have changed more than behavior).
125. See, e.g., Benjamin Bowser, Race Relations in the 1980s: The Case of the United
States, 15 J. BLACK STUD. 307, 318 (1995) (stating that racism is "a consequence of elite
group self-interest and the desire to maintain historic privilege"); Lawrence Bobo, Whites'
Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?, 45 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1196, 1208-09 (1983).
126. See, eg., Donald R. Kinder & David 0. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic
Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414,
427-30 (1981); David 0. Sears et al., Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or
Symbolic Politics?, 73 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 369, 380-83 (1979).
127. David Sears comments:
According to this theory, people acquire in early life standing predispositions that
influence their adult perceptions and attitudes. In adulthood, then, they respond
in highly affective ways to symbols that resemble the attitude objects to which
similar emotional responses were conditioned or associated in earlier life.
Whether or not the issue has some tangible consequence for the adult voter's
personal life is irrelevant. One's relevant personal 'stake' in the issue is an
emotional, symbolic one.
Sears et al., supra note 126, at 370-71.
128. See Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1188-89.
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native speakers.29 They are less likely to assist strangers whom
they believe do not share their values, even where the assistance is of
minimal cost or inconvenience. In a broader sense, the ability to act
altruistically has been linked with the ability to take the perspective
of others, 30 that is, to see or at least imagine similarity or identity
with the other.
One might contend that the results in these studies simply
illustrate the effect of the subject's socialization, that is, that they had
been taught that foreigners or other groups were less deserving of
help. But studies have shown that when subjects are divided into
groups on grounds that have nothing to do with traditional social
prejudices, and when contact between the groups is minimized in
order to minimize the possibility of realistic bases for antagonism,
groups continue to show clear biases against the outgroup.
For example, a 1973 study 31 looked at the behavior of subjects
playing a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, a classic social science model
that explores whether a subject will act selfishly or cooperatively.3 2
Half of the pairs playing the game were told that they had matching
personality profiles; the other half were told that they had discrepant
profiles. 33 The pairs told that they were similar exhibited far more
cooperative behavior." Another study divided subjects into three
groups who were told that the groups were composed of those who
had indicated similar preferences among photographs, although they
had actually been assigned at random. 35 With no prior or expected
future interaction either with their own or the other group, they were
asked to rate members of each group on personality traits. There was
129. See Roy E. Feldman, Response to Compatriot and Foreigner Who Seek Assistance,
10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 206-12 (1968).
130. See Bill Underwood & Bert Moore, Perspective-Taking and Altruism, 91 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 143, 169-71 (1981).
131. Kenneth L. Dion, Cohesiveness as a Determinant of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias, 28
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 163 (1973).
132. In a "prisoner's dilemma" game, the best result is reached for each subject when
both choose to cooperate; but when only one acts cooperatively and the other "double-
crosses" him, the former fares far worse. Thus, the game largely tests one's willingness to
trust that another will behave cooperatively. See Anatol Rapoport, Prisoner's Dilemma,
in, 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 973-74 (1992).
133. Dion, supra note 131, at 165.
134. Id. at 167.
135. Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A
Cognitive-Motivational Approach, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307, 308 (1979) (summarizing the
study conducted in W. Doise et al., An Experimental Investigation Into The Formation of
Intergroup Representation, 2 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 202 (1972)).
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a significant tendency to rate members of one's own group more
positively.' 6 Thus, researchers have concluded that:
[T]he mere perception of belonging to two distinct
groups-that is, social categorization per se-is sufficient to
trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the ingroup. In
other words, the mere awareness of the presence of an out-
group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or
discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group. 7
As Professor Duckitt points out in his survey of research into
prejudice, this model, in which "[i]ntergroup bias and discrimination
are ... seen as inevitable outcomes of a normal, natural, and
universal cognitive process that function[s] to simplify and make
more manageable the complexity of the social world," does not
account for all types of bias. 8 By itsel this model explains neither
the differences in levels of prejudice among individuals, nor the line
between merely self-favoritism and active dislike or hatred of the
outgroup.139 Duckitt states that "[t]his suggests that ... ingroup
bias may be only a precursor of prejudice that can be elaborated into
prejudice under particular social conditions.""4 He calls for an
integration of approaches to the study of prejudice that draw on both
individual cognitive factors and social factors.'4'
Developmental psychology would also seem to lend support to
the proposition that the initial reaction to a perception of difference
is to disfavor it. Infants and small children, although they vary in the
intensity of their reaction, are wary of strangers.'42 One experiment
showed that fifth and sixth grade students performed worse and
displayed higher levels of anxiety where an arithmetic test was
proctored by a stranger than by a teacher they knew.3 At the
same time, the tendency to fear strangers can be overcome. Studies
show that a small child will learn to be open to strangers through
136. Id.
137. Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33,38 (William G. Austin & Stephen
Worchel eds., 1979).
138. Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1188-89.
139. Studies differ on "whether [in-group bias] rests on enhancement of the in-group,
devaluation of the out-group, or both." Brewer, supra note 135, at 321-22.
140. Duckitt, supra note 110, at 1189.
141. Id. at 1189-91.
142. See Ross A. Thomson & Michael E. Lamb, Security of Attachment and Stranger
Sociability in Infancy, 19 DEV. PSYCHOL. 184, 189-91 (1983).
143. Arnold P. DeRosa & Frank Patalano, Effects of Familiar Proctor on Fifth and
Sixth Grade Students' Test Anxiety, 68 PSYCHOL. REP. 103, 109-11 (1991).
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observing his or her mother: If the mother is friendly and open
toward strangers, or to a particular stranger, the child will copy that
friendliness.'"
What does all of this suggest? Clearly, the question of the origins
of prejudice is not an either-or choice between internal and external
factors. Social norms can support and help fuel prejudice. People do
teach others "to hate and fear," and that is surely significant. But
these findings strongly suggest that all prejudice does not flow from
external factors. Thus, if we could successfully eliminate social norms
favoring prejudice, we would be left not with a starting point of
nondiscrimination, but still with an individual tendency to perceive
differences between people and to display a bias against those
perceived as different and in favor of those seen as similar to the self.
Thus, the minimization, if not the elimination, of prejudice depends
not merely on the elimination of social norms supporting
discrimination, but on the active process of teaching and modeling
tolerant behavior.
An interesting study by David Frey and Samuel Gaertner
illustrates this point and also highlights the significance of social clues
or pressures. 45 Frey and Gaertner constructed a study in which the
subjects, white female undergraduates, observed workers performing
a task that required them to form words from Scrabble letters.146
The subjects were free to assist the workers. 47 Conditions were
manipulated to induce the subjects to believe that the workers were
having difficulty either because of their own poor work habits or
because of the difficulty of the task. 4' Subjects would then be
asked to help, with the requests coming either from the workers or
from a third party.49 Half of the workers were white, half
black. 50
As one might expect, subjects were significantly more likely to
help workers when the source of the difficulty was not seen to be the
144. See Candice Feiring et al., Indirect Effects and Infant's Reaction to Strangers, 20
DEV. PSYCHOL. 485, 490 (1986); Carolyn Zahn-Waxler & Marian Radke-Yarrow, Child
Rearing and Children's Prosocial Initiations Toward Victims of Distress, 50 CHILD DEV.
319, 327-29 (1979).
145. David L. Frey & Samuel L. Gaertner, Helping and the Avoidance of Inappropriate
Interracial Behavior: A Strategy that Perpetuates a Nonprejudiced Self-Image, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1083 (1986).
146. Id. at 1084.
147. Id. at 1085.
148. Id,
149. Id.
150. Id.
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worker's poor work habits, but instead, was seen to be something not
the worker's fault.'5' But there were also distinct racial differences.
When the source of the worker's problem was the difficulty of the
task, and the worker directly asked for help, the subjects assisted
white workers only slightly more often than black workers.' But
when the subjects perceived the source of the worker's problems as
the worker's fault, and the worker asked for help, the subjects assisted
white workers 73% of the time and black workers only 33% of the
time.53
However, when a third party made the request, the results were
dramatically different. Not only was the entire difference in the
subjects' willingness to assist black and white workers whose problems
appeared to stem from their own work habits eliminated, in fact the
subjects were slightly more likely to assist the black workers!4
Thus, in the absence of social reinforcement of the appropriateness of
helping blacks who were in the same objective circumstances as
whites, white subjects were much more likely to overlook a white
worker's own fault for his predicament than a black worker's. This
effect was eliminated when helping blacks was endorsed by a third
party.
This experiment seems to illustrate several points. It is unlikely
that the subjects consciously set out to act in a biased manner. When
they saw a clearly "deserving" black, they were almost as willing to
help as when they were approached by a "deserving" white. When
they refused to help an "undeserving" black, it is likely that they
consciously acted on the basis not of race, but of their reaction to the
worker's own fault in creating the problem. Yet they were far more
willing to help "undeserving" whites. They were, then, less critical
and more forgiving of their own group. Yet, one suspects they were
not conscious of this. Thus, when social pressure was not brought to
help the outgroup, subjects could show a bias, yet believe, and even
justify if asked, that there was a race-neutral explanation for their
behavior in each individual case.
A recent study of bank lending habits by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago produced results quite similar to Gaertner and
151. Id. at 1086 tbl. 1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Frey's experimental findings." The study compared the treatment
of mortgage applicants of different races who had similar credit
histories.16 Black and Hispanic applicants with clearly good credit
histories were accepted about as often as comparable white ap-
plicants.1 7  However, among applicants with "marginal" credit
histories, twice as many minorities were rejected as were whites."
Bias is likely to emerge in cases in which it is not overt or even
conscious. In each individual case of rejection, the loan officer could
plausibly contend that it was the objective factor of a weak credit
history, rather than the race of the applicant, that led to rejection.
Yet, the same credit history might be looked upon more leniently if
the loan officer felt a similarity between himself and the applicant.
Therefore, the study concluded that "[t]hese findings are consistent
with the existence of a cultural affinity between white lending officers
and white applicants, and a cultural gap between white loan officers
and marginal minority applicants.' 5 9
One's tendency to start with an aversion to those who are
different does not mean that one ought, or must, maintain that
attitude. Substantially all theories of developmental psychology
maintain that growth and maturity are processes by which one's
concern moves from the self outward. In terms of individual cognitive
psychology, Jean Piaget has demonstrated that the child begins from
a completely egocentric position, gradually learns to respect the
reality of persons and things outside the self, and ultimately develops
the capacity to empathize with and understand the feelings of
others.'6
Lawrence Kohlberg maintains that a process of ethical maturity
requires that the individual progress from a point of concern with the
welfare of those closest to the sel, to a respect for the pragmatic
155. William C. Hunter & Mary Beth Walker, The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and
Mortgage Lending Decisions, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper 95-8 (July
1995).
156. Id. at 1-3.
157. Id. at 18.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 16.
160. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932)
(tracing the stages of a child's moral growth). For a discussion and application of Piaget's
work in a legal context, see Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling
the Free Speech Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 769, 781-94 (1995); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in
the Modem Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 477, 493-513 (1995).
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value of rules in promoting the welfare of the community, and finally
to a universal set of ethical norms in which, presumably, strangers will
be regarded with the same concern as neighbors. 6' Kohlberg's
work has been criticized by some, most notably Carol Gilligan and
other feminist theorists, who maintain that a commitment to universal
norms is not necessarily the highest form of ethical thinking.62
Gilligan, for instance, argues that care and concern for particular
others can be just as valid an ethical position as respect for abstract
norms, and that such ethical thinking is more prevalent among
women.
163
Whatever their differences, Kohlberg and Gilligan share with
other social scientists the position that the individual grows by moving
beyond selfishness, by learning to respect and empathize with others
and by overcoming the initial fear and aversion to difference. It is
also important to note that in the view of these social scientists this
process of growth does not occur easily, and does not occur in
everyone."6 Indeed, Kohlberg maintains that only a small fraction
of people reach the highest levels of moral reasoning.1' A sig-
nificant number of adults never progress beyond more narrow
conceptions of whose welfare counts and why.' While only the
truly antisocial never progress beyond the initial stage of complete
childish selfishness, many live their entire lives making moral
distinctions merely on the basis of the proposition that following clear
rules will make life more harmonious in one's immediate com-
mumity.167
Thus, much social science evidence suggests that the view
represented by Hammerstein's lyrics is quite flawed. We do not begin
life with an attitude or tendency to respect and value those who are
161. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 44-62, 172-205 (1984). Kohlberg's theories are summarized in
Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experimental Teaching, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 506-12 (1995).
162. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN a DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 31-63 (1982).
163. Id. Steven Hartwell summarizes and analyzes the critiques of Kohlberg. Hartwell,
supra note 161, at 512-22.
164. See Hartwell, supra note 161, at 511; see also Paul T. Wangerin, Objective,
Multiplistic and Relative Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1237, 1273-81 (1988) (applying this theory to the process of development of skills
during legal education).
165. KOHLBERG, supra note 161, at 55-58.
166. Some of Kohlberg's findings indicate "that Stage 4 [rules are followed because
conformity to rules is generally good] is the dominant stage of most adults." Id. at 55-57.
167. Id at 55-68.
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different, which needs only to be protected from negative social
influence in order to flourish. Instead, we begin with a tendency
toward selfishness. As we grow to understand the reality of the
existence of others, we learn to empathize, but our initial tendency is
to do so in ways that favor those perceived as most like ourselves.
However, this is no cause for despair, only for vigilance.
This is also, of course, no reason to deny the existence and
pernicious effect of external social influences that nourish the original
tendency toward selfishness. The potential for society to do harm
along these lines is great, and to that extent, the warning of Ham-
merstein's lyrics is accurate. Yet merely eliminating negative
influences, it seems, will not be enough. Clearly, individuals can grow
beyond exclusive concern for self and those perceived as most similar
to self But this requires active support from other individuals and
institutions.
This support will not be a matter simply of a one-time inoculation
of the individual against prejudice. Studies have shown that many
people conform to norms of tolerance and the avoidance of
discrimination only where clear social norms support them."' Thus,
social neutrality will permit selfish and intolerant attitudes to flourish.
Consequently, more than neutrality is required. On a larger scale, we
can see the persistence of hostility to outgroups in the world's recent
epidemic of nationalist and ethnic violence within what have been for
decades larger multiethnic communities. Croatian-Serbian, Hutu-
Tutsi, Armenian-Azerbaijani, and other clashes vividly illustrate that
progress toward harmonious intergroup relations is not inevitable and
is subject to sharp reversal.
How, then, should all of this affect the debate on affirmative
action? When we work from the assumption that individuals tend to
favor similar, "ingroup" people, the analysis of what government can
and should do becomes quite different from that which flows from a
starting point in which we maintain that our initial tendencies are not
to discriminate.
168. See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson et al., Social Desirability, Religious Orientation and
Racial Prejudice, 17 J. FOR SC!. STUDY RELIGION 31, 37-40 (1978) (stressing the
importance of social norms in accounting for the absence of prejudice); Glenn A.E. Griffin
et al., A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Religious Orientation, Social Norms and Prejudice,
26 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 358, 363-65 (1987) (same).
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFFIRvAkTIVE ACTION
"I am against nature. I don't dig nature at all.... I think
the truly natural things are dreams, which nature can't touch
with decay." - Bob Dylan'69
If we abandon the idea that in the absence of positive social-and
particularly government imposed-incentives to discriminate, we will
all assume our natural position of nondiscrimination, in realization
that the tendency to discriminate in favor of those like oneself
appears to be universal, what does this mean for affirmative action?
The first thing that must be emphasized is that what is "natural,"
whether a function of sociobiology or universal aspects of very early
childhood socialization, is not necessarily desirable.7 ° Much can be
said for the proposition that human aggression is "natural." Certainly
this does not lead to the conclusion that government must accept or
be indifferent to violence. On the contrary, it provides an even
stronger incentive for government and other social institutions to act
vigorously to curb it.
Similarly, the most cogent response to those who defended racial
segregation as "natural" was to maintain that such an approach says
nothing about the future. People and societies also have a natural
potential for growth, and just as government must assist in curbing
any natural inclinations toward inappropriate aggression, it must assist
in curbing any natural inclinations toward racial and ethnic prejudice.
The first step, of course, is to prohibit overt discrimination against
racial minorities; but is this all that is necessary, or indeed, all that is
constitutionally permitted?
Certainly, when government makes race a factor, something
beyond minimal scrutiny is required. No Supreme Court justice has
ever called for complete deference to the legislature, state or national,
in this sensitive area.' At the very least, some degree of narrow
tailoring will be required and an important, if not compelling,
government interest must be shown. The majority of the findings
169. Quoted in ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 622
(1993).
170. For a discussion of the growth of the human sense of moral responsibility from
concern with small groups to concern for larger communities, see JAmEs Q. WILSON, THE
MORAL SENSE 191-221 (1993).
171. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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discussed here most directly address the existence of a sufficiently
strong government interest.
As we have seen, advocates of "forward-looking" rationales for
affirmative action have had little success persuading courts of the
importance, if not the validity, of their asserted goals. 73 While this
may be due in great part to the difficulty of precisely outlining the
future goal in mind, it may also be due in some measure to the
distinction between fixing something that is deficient, on the one
hand, and merely improving a generally acceptable state of affairs, on
the other. Given that the former is generally what courts do, judges
are obviously more likely to see such interests as "compelling," that
is, essential government activity.174 The latter, on the other hand,
is more likely to be seen as less central to government's role.
The Court, in searching for "backward-looking" justifications,
works with the implicit assumption that discrimination is the product
only of conscious, culpable acts. Because of this it insists on a
demonstration of concrete "guilt." Often, of course, this is absent.
In these cases, defenders of affirmative actions are prone to accept
the necessity of a showing of guilt, but to argue that a more diffuse
and subtle form of guilt is present, often described as "unconscious
racism" or "institutional racism."' 5
But the charge of institutional racism usually is ineffective to
change minds. First of all, the claim is unlikely to create actual
feelings of guilt. The difference here might be analogized to the
difference between responsibility for one's own conscious sins and a
feeling that one participates, as a human being, in some type of
"original sin." A credible theological argument can be made that the
imperfections of the human condition doom us all to some measure
of sin despite our best efforts to avoid any conscious transgression.
But it is difficult to feel a sense of actual guilt for "original sin"; it is
the equivalent of feeling guilt about one's own existence. Attempts
to persuade one who feels no guilt not only to accept it, but to accept
it along with the epithet of "racism," are likely to be futile.Y7 6
173. See supra notes 69-70, 84-87 and accompanying text.
174. Determining what constitutes a compelling government interest, as opposed to one
that is merely legitimate or important, is one of the more difficult questions of
constitutional law. See generally Conference on Compelling Government Interests: The
Mystery of Constitutional Analysis, 55 ALB. L. REv. 534 et seq. (1992) (symposium
presenting various positions on the nature of compelling interests).
175. See Lawrence, supra note 101, at 328-44.
176. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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Can we design a type of affirmative action that satisfies strict
scrutiny without resort to "guilt"? We can, if we accept the following
propositions. First, government is authorized to take steps to assure
equal opportunity and to eliminate race as a salient factor in
important decisions concerning employment and education. Second,
the human predisposition to favor those perceived as similar to
oneself appears to be nearly universal. Therefore, although it is
surely necessary to prohibit conscious acts of racial discrimination, this
will likely be insufficient. At least some further steps are necessary
to make our natural biases evident and to counteract them. But this
need not be done under the labels of "guilt" or "shame.' 77
Some other types of bias recently identified by social science
provide a rough analogy. Studies over the last two decades have
convincingly demonstrated that teachers, employers, and others
consistently act, in evaluating and relating to students, employees, and
others, with a bias in favor of physically attractive people.178 For
the most part, this is not intentional or even conscious.1 79 Teachers,
for example, will rate the written work attributed to attractive
students as being objectively better than the same work attributed to
unattractive students.18
Clearly, this is wrong. What would a conscientious school
administrator do to assure that it did not happen in his or her school?
One possibility would be to issue a memorandum instructing faculty
not to discriminate against unattractive students in assigning grades or
other rewards, or in the manner in which they deal with students in
177. Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that attempts to trigger guilt or shame
may be counterproductive. One study demonstrates that whites who have taught
themselves to act in a non-hostile way toward blacks often regress to more hostile attitudes
if they perceive that they have been insulted by blacks. Ronald W. Rogers & Steven
Prentice-Dunn, Deindividuation and Anger-Mediated Interracial Aggression: Unmasking
Regressive Racism, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 63, 70-72 (1981). Thus, if
charges of racism are perceived as insults by whites, these accusations may act as self-
fulfilling prophecies.
178. See, e.g., Karen K. Dion et al. What Is Beautiful Is Good, 24 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 285,288-89 (1972); Karen K. Dion, Physical Attractiveness and Evaluation
of Children's Transgressions, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 207,213 (1972); Barrie
J. Guise et al., Effects of Physical Attractiveness on Perception of Social Skill, 54
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1039, 1040-42 (1982).
179. Karen Dion, for example, has found that adults will perceive transgressions by an
attractive child as being less serious than those same acts committed by an unattractive
child. Dion, supra note 178, at 212.
180. See Margaret M. Clifford & Elaine Walster, The Effect of Physical Attractiveness
on Teacher Expectations, 46 SOC. EDUc. 248, 255-56 (1973); Lina Zahr, Physical
Attractiveness and Lebanese Children's School Performance, 56 PSYCHOL. REP. 191 (1985).
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class. But this memo would likely have little effect. Since the biases
are unconscious and unintentional, no teacher would be likely to
regard it as relevant to his or her own performance.
Another alternative would be for the administrator to act
affirmatively. Of course, this does not mean that the principal would
instruct teachers to assign a certain number of "As" to physically
unattractive students; but it might mean that, in the first instance, the
administrator would explain the social science findings to the teachers.
Additionally, the administration might ask the teachers to consider
whether these types of unconscious biases are occurring in their own
classroom. Such actions would not be taken with an intent to trigger
guilt or shame about past performance but rather to spark a commit-
ment to become a better teacher.
The teacher might be asked to focus specifically on whether
physically attractive students seem to be receiving a disproportionate
share of classroom attention or rewards. If this should prove to be
the case, a reexamination of supposedly objective criteria would be in
order, involving consideration such as the following: Is it really true
that the work product of unattractive students is inferior on as-
signments such as essays, where there is room for subjective
judgment? Is it really necessary for all of the roles in the school play
to go to attractive students? Of course, there may be no evidence of
such a bias in an individual classroom, but the question of whether
there is must be highlighted in order to be addressed.
Once raised, the question may lead to some changes that we
might describe as affirmative action. In class, the teacher might act
to assure that a mix of attractive and unattractive students receives
attention, regardless of which students consistently raise their hands
to volunteer. Outside of class, close cases in casting the school play
might be decided to assure that physical appearance is not un-
consciously acting as the deciding factor by seeing to it that some less
attractive students win roles. As long as this type of behavior is
limited to self-critical efforts to guard against unconscious bias, and
does not go further to assure unwarranted rewards for unattractive
students, none of this activity can be seen as illegitimate.
Similarly, with respect to race, it may be insufficient merely to
tell decisionmakers to disregard race. To a great extent, the tendency
to favor one's ingroup is not intentional or even conscious; but if
behavior is monitored, and it shows a pattern of results that indicates
the presence of bias, this should serve as a constitutionally sufficient
predicate for at least some affirmative steps. These measures need
not include strict, outcome-based steps such as quotas or set-asides,
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but they surely may include reexamination of the validity of previous-
ly imposed criteria if these criteria tend toward an outcome that
shows a bias against an outgroup. How much weight should be
assigned to differences on a standardized test, as opposed to other
criteria of academic or job performances?' Should the low bid
trump all other factors in awarding public contracts?1 2
Under strict, or even heightened scrutiny, two questions are to be
addressed. At least in theory, the initial question, the presence of a
compelling or substantial state interest, must be answered in the
affirmative to justify any type of affirmative action. If the legacy of
Croson and Adarand is that only specific acts of past discrimination
will ever serve to justify affirmative action, then it would follow that
even the least objectionable programs, such as outreach programs
targeted to minorities but granting no further favoritism, would be
problematic. But in light of Justice O'Connor's hedging as to just
how strict the strict scrutiny of Adarand is"s it seems unlikely that
these cases actually have gone that far.
If Justice Powell's conclusion that limited forms of affirmative
action are justified in higher education admissions'84 still survives,
then two things seem true. First, at least in some cases, individualized
past guilt is not necessary to justify affirmative action, and second, the
two parts of the strict scrutiny test may not be entirely independent
inquiries. In other words, in Croson and Adarand the absence of
individualized past guilt may not have been sufficient to support the
scope of the particular plan at issue, but a more narrowly tailored
plan might have been justified on some other rationale.
Thus, the existence of a bias toward those perceived as similar to
oneself; together with the clear fact that race is a much more obvious
cognitive distinction than many other qualities, should suffice to
provide a compelling interest for government programs carefully
designed to counteract that bias. In all likelihood, this rationale will
be insufficient to justify the most aggressive forms of affirmative
action, those that set aside fixed percentages of participation for
minorities. Such programs, if justifiable at all, will have to depend on
the type of showing of past discrimination demanded in Croson and
Adarand.
181. Allan Bakke based his claim of entitlement largely upon his test scores. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78 n.7 (1978).
182. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102-04 (1995).
183. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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The rationale set forth above should, however, be sufficient to
justify more modest programs. When statistics indicate that minorities
are underrepresented, outreach efforts to include qualified minorities
in the applicant pool may be called for. More important, a self-
critical attitude toward the value of currently used decisionmaking
criteria may be appropriate. Might too much emphasis be placed on
performance on standardized tests, and not enough upon prior
academic or work experience, in decisions involving academic
admissions or job promotion?"8 5 Do hiring decisions involving
college graduates place too much emphasis on the reputation of the
school attended, automatically preferring the graduate of Harvard
over the graduate of Howard? Making such inquiries does no more
than offset natural biases. In appropriate contexts, such as university
admissions decisions, the existence of a "forward-looking" reason to
regard diversity as directly related to the mission of the institution
involved might combine with the need to counteract natural bias to
justify the "plus factors" treatment of racial diversity approved in
Bakke. But, again consistent with Bakke, programs that go further
will require a higher level of justification.
If we accept the notion that the fundamental rationale behind
affirmative action is to counterbalance the natural tendency to favor
those like oneself we are led to several interesting subsidiary
conclusions. First of all, in certain contexts, this theory does accept
the real possibility of a "reverse discrimination," though on a
narrower plane than the term is now often used. The tendency
toward bias to ingroups is not exclusively held by whites. Thus, where
minority groups have acquired political and economic power, they will
not be able to justify their affirmative action programs as easily on the
grounds that they are offsetting ingroup bias. Perhaps the strongest
defense of at least the outcome in Croson focuses on the fact that the
program was adopted by a majority black city council."8 6 While this
fact should not be determinative, it does seem to call for a more
careful explanation than is required for a program not adopted to
benefit the ingroup of those who adopted it.
185. Justice William 0. Douglas was skeptical of affirmative action in university
admissions, but even more opposed to reliance on standardized tests. See Nicholas
Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. IMEs, June 11, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at
36, 52.
186. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J.
concurring) (finding that the set-aside was "clearly and directly beneficial to the dominant
political group, which happens also to be the dominant racial group").
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This analysis should also have an effect on the question of the
permissible duration of affirmative action programs. One consistent
theme has been that affirmative action should be temporary, lasting
only as long as necessary to eliminate the effects of the previous guilty
acts that disrupted the presumed normal state of equal treatment.'87
But, as we have seen in a number of cases involving school
desegregation,'8 courts have had little success determining just
when prior guilt has been fully expiated. Much of this confusion may
flow from the assumption that only two alternatives exist, conscious
overt bias and non-bias, rather than allowing for the third possibility,
the existence of a natural, unconscious bias in favor of one's own
ingroup. Current law insists on the termination of affirmative action
when the more obvious form of bias ceases, and in effect declares the
more pervasive form of bias to be acceptable.
If there is something quite artificial about current attempts to
delineate acceptable duration periods, does that mean that some
forms of affirmative action will be permanent? While we need not go
so far, it may be the case that at least some minimal requirements of
conscious monitoring of diversity and outreach efforts will be
necessary for the foreseeable future. At some point, it is possible that
social conventions will have become so strong that they will seem to
offset natural biases with no nudging by government, but that day
hardly seems imminent.
Another possibility is that at some point, while individual biases
will remain, those in a position to exercise those biases will roughly
reflect the composition of the community as a whole. In such a case,
no group will be systematically disfavored, since the ingroup biases of
decisionmakers will more or less offset each other. While bias will
continue to exist, there may well be no strong sense that it amounts
to social injustice, since the system as a whole will not work against
any particular groups. To some extent, this must remain only
speculation; but as inconsistent as it is with commonly accepted
notions, a minimal level of race consciousness, that is, enough to alert
decisionmakers to the possibility that they are acting in a biased way,
may be necessary as a permanent offset to what appears to be a
permanent tendency toward bias.
187. "The temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will
not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate." Fullilove V.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
188. See, ag., Freeman v. Pitts, 500 U.S. 940 (1992); Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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Adarand has been cited by some as the death knell for affir-
mative action. Only a few years ago, however, the same was said of
Croson. Croson, of course, did not end affirmative action at the state
and local levels, but it did require government to think more
rigorously about the ends and means of the programs. Adarand calls
for the federal government to do the same. The most aggressive
forms of affirmative action, those that employ numerical goals or set-
asides, seem clearly to be limited to instances where a demonstration
of intentional past discrimination can be made. The elimination of
such discrimination, however, should not be seen as the sole possible
justification for any type of program that is sensitive to race. The
evidence of a pervasive tendency for people to favor those perceived
as similar to themselves provides a compelling justification for
government programs that go no further than insisting that decision-
makers monitor this tendency and take steps necessary to offset it.
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that an optimistic and apparently quite benign view of
human nature could serve to impede the very goal of eliminating
racial bias sought by those who were the first to promote it. But the
notion that we start life with a natural sense of inclusive
egalitarianism and that biases result only from the introduction of
pathologies by society seems to have done just that. Courts, whose
own traditional role is to fix disturbances in the status quo, have
taken that perspective as their model of what serves as a compelling
state interest, and insisted on the identification of discrete acts of
racial bias to justify affirmative action. Their goal is to restore the
initial, presumably bias-free, state of things, and to go no further.
Anything beyond that would itself be bias.
But social science supports a contrary view. People begin life
with a tendency to discern similarities and differences between
themselves and others. This leads throughout life to a bias toward
those perceived as similar, and against those perceived as different.
Reduction and elimination of these biases is achieved through
personal and social growth and change; it does not just happen.
When we adopt this view, we can see that government's job to create
a community free of racial bias requires more than the elimination of
overt guilty acts. While that sort of racism no doubt exists, and must
be dealt with, unconscious biases also present social problems
appropriate for a legislative response.
To recognize the tendency toward bias is not necessarily a
pessimistic position, any more than it is pessimistic to recognize the
1180 [Vol. 74
JUSTIFYING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
need to inoculate people against physical disease. Optimism looks to
the future, and insists that we can move beyond where we now find
ourselves. Evidence of individual and social growth indicates that bias
can be overcome, that people can extend their ideas of who belongs
as part of their "ingroup." But the negation of bias requires effort;
it is not merely something that comes naturally. Thus, while the
elimination of overt acts of past racial discrimination clearly serves as
a compelling state interest, it should not be the only interest sufficient
to justify affirmative action. Legislatures have a compelling interest
in creating equal opportunity, and to do this may require at least
limited action to offset natural biases.
This recognition does not eliminate the need to tailor the
affirmative action response. Programs that monitor the actions of
decisionmakers, point at evidence of possible unconscious bias, and
insist on outreach and careful reconsideration of the validity of
currently employed standards for distributing rewards, clearly act to
offset natural biases. Programs that go further, to set firm numerical
goals, may well go too far in response to this interest, and be
appropriate only for cases of overt, intentional bias; but the need for
some forms of affirmative action will persist regardless of the presence
of such overt, guilty acts.
Oscar Hammerstein was surely correct in his assessment of the
importance of social influence in determining the level of racial bias.
Society can nurture and exacerbate existing biases, and in these cases,
remedial action is called for. But his ironic assertion that people have
to be taught to hate and fear masks the actual truth that it is the
absence of hate and fear that must be carefully taught. While Croson
and Adarand may make the most aggressive forms of affirmative
action extremely rare, they should not be read to eliminate the
possibility that government may act, in a self-critical way, to assure
that natural biases are offset.
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